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LOSS OF A CHANCE 
Ben Smith * 
Compensation for the loss of a chance has the potential to revolutionise the law of civil obligations 
as it is known today. It is an innovative theory of damages which was first conceived of at the 
beginning of this century. It effectively reformulates the damage as the loss of a chance to which the 
balance of the probabilities test still applies. 1 This is consistent with the orthodox 'all or nothing' 
causation rule. 2 Its impact however has been delayed and it is only in the last decade that its challenge 
to orthodoxy has become clear. The primary purpose of this paper therefore is to consider whether or 
not compensation for loss of a chance represents only a subset of the law of damages or its complete 
destruction. 
I INTRODUCTION 
A Purpose 
This paper aims to identify the origins and prescribe the limits of the loss of a chance 
theory. Damages were first awarded for loss of a chance in contract and were initially 
confined to solicitors' negligence actions. In this context, loss of a chance damages reinforce 
the fundamental goals of contract law. They protect the reasonable expectations of the 
respective parties and the interests of those who have reasonably relied on the promises or 
behaviour of others. 3 Loss of a chance damages also have origins in medical negligence law. 
However in the late twentieth century, the loss of a chance theory has slipped its theoretical 
moorings and drifted into previously uncharted areas of liability. Today in all 
Commonwealth jurisdictions even the loss of a commercial opportunity is compensated; not 
* This is an edited version of a paper submitted in fulfilment of the VUW LLB(Hons) requirements. 
1 Jane  Stapleton "The Gist Of Negligence" (1988) 104 LQR 389, 396. 
2 The text book example of the 'but for' causation test can be seen in Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington HMC 
[1969] 1 All ER 1068 (CA). 
3 P S Atiyah An Introduction to the Law of Contract (5 Ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) 34­36.
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only in contract, but also in tort. This development has been spearheaded by an expansionary 
High Court of Australia which has stated that: 4 
Damages for deprivation of a commercial opportunity by reason of breach of contract or tort should 
be ascertained by reference to the court's assessment of the prospects of success of that opportunity 
had it been pursued. 
Not all jurists are as eager as the Australian High Court to so rapidly expand the 
application of loss of a chance. Millet LJ has recently injected an element of realism into this 
theory by emphasising that the lost chance must be more than just speculation. His Honour 
quoted Vaughan Williams LJ in Chaplin v Hicks 5 who stated that: 6 
There are cases no doubt, where the loss is so dependent on the mere unrestricted volition of 
another that it is impossible to say that there is any assessable loss resulting from the breach. 
It is therefore necessary to consider the consequences and validity of the rapid and 
generally unprincipled expansion of loss of a chance damages. 
B Overview 
The paper develops a loss of a chance paradigm based on the seminal case of Chaplin v 
Hicks. In this case damages were awarded for a contestant's lost chance of competing in a 
beauty pageant. This case is the foundation of the 'loss of a chance' theory and the analysis 
assumes that it is good law. The paper therefore outlines the generalised 'contest­like' facts of 
Chaplin v Hicks and then seeks to isolate the key principles of the case. Chaplin v Hicks 
becomes the paradigm from which any extension of the loss of a chance theory must be 
justified. The paper firstly examines the 'tendering' cases. Secondly the extension of loss of a 
chance to tort is considered. It is clear from Lord Goff's speech in Henderson v Merrett 
Syndicates Ltd 7 that the law of tort is the general law out of which the parties can, if they 
wish, contract. In light of the increasing judicial development of concurrent liability and the 
unpopularity of a rigid compartmentalisation of tort and contract it appears unlikely that loss 
of a chance damages should be confined to the contractual 'default rules.' 
4 Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL and Ors 120 ALR 16 (HCA) ["Sellars"]. 
5 Chaplin v Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786, 792­793 (CA) ["Chaplin v Hicks"]. 
6 Allied Maples Group Lt v Simmons & Simmons (a firm) [1995] 4 All ER 907, 930 (CA) ["Allied Maples"]. 
7 [1995] 2 AC 145, 193 (HL) ["Henderson v Merett Syndicates"].
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A lost chance caused by the negligence of a professional advisor fits the flip­side of the 
paradigm; a loss of the chance to be free from future uncertainty, can be viewed as the loss of 
the right to compete. The paper however criticises the common judicial approach of justifying 
the extension on the basis of a distinction between past and hypothetical events. The reversal 
of the burden of proof is also postulated as an alternative means of mitigating a plaintiff's 
causation problem. Finally the paper considers the degree to which compensation for lost 
commercial opportunities is consistent with the Chaplin v Hicks paradigm. 
II THE FOUNDATIONS OF LOSS OF A CHANCE 
A Introduction 
At common law there is no good reason why a party may not contract for the benefit of a 
chance. 8 If the contract contains a promise to provide the chance, breach of that contract 
results in the loss of that chance. In contract, breach is actionable per se, in contrast to tort 
where the damage forms the basis of the action. Thus a plaintiff will recover more than 
nominal damages if he or she is wrongly denied the benefit of the chance contracted for. Any 
difficulties in estimating the loss in monetary terms will not defeat an award of damages. 9 
B Origins 
1 Contract 
In Chaplin v Hicks 10 the plaintiff was a young woman who  entered a beauty contest by 
submitting her photograph to a newspaper. She was one of fifty contestants short­listed from 
six thousand applicants. This formed a contractual relationship. Each contestant was to be 
interviewed by the defendant, who would then select twelve women to gain employment as 
actresses. The plaintiff was unable to attend the interview on the stipulated date, and the 
defendant in breach of contract refused to reschedule the interview. 
8 B Coote "Chance and the Burden of Proof in Contract and Tort" (1988) 62 ALJ 761,771 cites Pallister v 
Waikato Hospital Bd 2 NZLR 725,736 (HC) a case in which a person with suicidal tendencies could 
contract with others for protection from the chance of suicide. 
9 Fink v Fink (1946) 74 CLR 127,143. 
10 The earliest application of the theory is Richardson v Mellish (1824) 2 Bing 229 which was approved in 
Chaplin v Hicks, see further H McGregor McGregor on Damages (16 Ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1997) 
246; and SM Waddams The Law of Damages (2 Ed, Canada Law Book Inc, Toronto, 1991) 13.280.
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The defendant could not claim damages for the lost prize itself as she would be unable to 
prove on the balance of the probabilities that if interviewed, she would have won. However 
the court acknowledged that but for the conduct of the defendant the plaintiff would have 
had the chance of competing. This chance was a valuable right, the loss of which could be 
compensated. The court rejected the proposition that whenever the contingencies on which 
the result depends are numerous and difficult to deal with, it is impossible to recover any 
damages for the loss of a chance or opportunity of winning the prize. Instead it held that 
since the average chance of each competitor was about one in four, the plaintiff should be 
awarded 25 per cent of what she would have gained had she been selected. 
2 Medical negligence 
Although Chaplin v Hicks is the leading loss of a chance case in the Commonwealth 
countries, it is not the exclusive origin of the theory. In the United States loss of a chance 
damages are  firmly grounded in medical negligence law. 11 The approach of the state level 
supreme courts which have considered the theory has been to analyse the extent to which loss 
of a chance damages reinforce the fundamental policy objectives of tort law. This is a 
utilitarian calculus which assesses whether or not loss of a chance damages reinforce the 
objectives of deterrence, the maximisation of social utility, the ascertainment of the truth, and 
compensation. Implicit in the compensation objective is acceptance of the view that human 
life has such paramount qualitative value that any lost chance to extend or improve it, 
inherently demands compensation. 
The United States courts have taken a purely instrumental view of tort law. 12 Tort law 
therefore is only understood to the extent that these goals (which have a justification outside 
of tort law) are advanced or frustrated. As such this approach views tort not as an end but 
purely as a means to an end. 
Although courts in the United States have accommodated the loss of a chance theory in 
the context of medical negligence, the approach of Commonwealth courts has been less 
conciliatory. The House of Lords has made it manifestly clear in Hotson v East Berkshire Area 
11 See Hicks v United States (1966) 368 F 2d 626 632 (4 th Cir 1996); Hamline v Bashline (1978) 481 Pa 256 392 
A 2d 1280 (1978), and Herskovits v Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound (1983) 664 P 2d 474 488 
(Wash 1983). 
12 Contrast the non­instrumentalist conception of tort law which focuses on the individual relationship 
between tortfeasor and victim and not the aggregate of these relationships; Ernest Weinrib "The Special 
Morality of Tort Law" (1989) 34 McGill L J 403.
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Health Authority 13 that loss of a chance damages are inappropriate in medical negligence 
cases. 
C The Stylised Facts of Chaplin v Hicks 
Chaplin v Hicks is the bedrock of loss of a chance in contract. This paper aims to rationalise 
any extension of the loss of a chance theory as an incremental analogous extension of Chaplin 
v Hicks. Thus it is necessary to isolate the stylised facts of the case in order to rationalise any 
future development. Essentially the breach of contract deprived the plaintiff of the chance to 
succeed in a contest. The chance that the defendant would select the plaintiff as a winner was 
a hypothetical fact. The plaintiff was one of a finite group of competitors who had given 
consideration for the  mathematical chance of receiving a definite, positive  benefit. Given that 
there was a finite number of possible outcomes 14 from the given 'experiment' the contestant 
had  a mathematical probability of winning. 15 This deductive result is logically independent 
of experience and proceeds from cause to effect. 
Having generalised the facts of Chaplin v Hicks it is now possible to reconcile and 
rationalise the development of the loss of a chance theory. This paper outlines a paradigm for 
loss of a chance damages. Any extension of the theory will have to come within this 
paradigm. 
D Tendering Processes 
Loss of a chance damages should be available to plaintiffs who lose their chance of 
competing in a contest­like situation with a finite number of competitors. These damages will 
13 [1987] AC 750 (HL) [Hotson]. In this case a hip injury which the plaintiff incurred falling out of a tree, 
was through negligence not diagnosed by the hospital until five days had elapsed. Had the correct 
diagnosis been made immediately with the appropriate treatment, there remained only a 75 per cent 
risk of the plaintiff's disability developing. The House of Lords adopted an 'all or nothing' approach 
where either the fall or the misdiagnosis caused the disability. On the balance of probabilities it was the 
fall. The valuation of a lost chance could only arise once causation had been established. Their 
Lordships were unwilling to entertain the plaintiff's claim that he had lost a 25 per cent chance of 
avoiding the disability. 
14 Either the plaintiff wins the contest or she does not. 
15 For example the consequence of throwing a coin has a mathematical probability as there is a finite 
number of outcomes; either heads or tails. So too has throwing a dice. See further Marc Stauch 
"Causation, Risk, and Loss of Chance in Medical Negligence" (1997) 17 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
205, 220.
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take into account first any expenditure incurred as a result of reasonable reliance on the 
contract; and secondly the expectation interest of the plaintiff. Therefore plaintiffs who have 
been aggrieved by irregularities in a tendering process come within this paradigm. New 
Zealand courts have followed the lead of the Supreme Court of Canada in analysing 
tendering systems in terms of two contracts. 16 The first contract (the secondary contract) 
arises in respect of the submission of the tender. The second (the primary contract) comes to 
fruition, if at all, when the tender is accepted. This approach gives effect to the reasonable 
expectations of the parties to create legal relations and protects the integrity of the tendering 
process. 
Markholm Construction Co Ltd v Wellington City Council 17 clearly comes within the 
paradigm. In this case the defendant advertised sections of property for sale at stipulated 
prices. A ballot would be held in the event of more than one bid for one section. The 
defendant  underpriced the market and as a result attracted numerous bids. On account of 
this mistake, it refused to hold the advertised ballot. This amounted to a breach of the 
contract which had come into existence by the plaintiff's reply to the defendant's unilateral 
offer to the public. Just as in Chaplin v Hicks the defendant had lost a valuable mathematical 
chance of winning a contest (the ballot) from a finite group of competitors. The defendant's 
breach of the secondary contract meant that it lost the chance of securing the primary 
contract. 
The most recent 'tendering' case to come within the paradigm in New Zealand is the High 
Court decision of Pratt Contractors Ltd v Palmerston North City Council. 18 In this case the 
defendant Council advertised for tenders to be submitted for the construction of a flyover 
bridge in Palmerston North. Upon receipt of the tender and a $100 non­refundable deposit 
the Council would first assess the ability of the contractor to complete the project on a 
pass/fail basis. If the criteria were met, the Council would then award the contract to the 
lowest tenderer. The plaintiff had submitted the lowest tender, but was not considered 
because a third party had submitted an alternative tender which stated that it would complete 
the project for $250,000 less than their nearest rival. This saving was made possible by 
changes in the Council's design plan. The third party was subsequently awarded the contract. 
16 R in Right of Ontario v Ron Engineering & Construction Eastern Lt [1981] 1 SCR 111. See also Blackpool and 
Fylde Aero Club Lt v Blackpool Borough Council [1990] 3 All ER 25 (CA). 
17 [1985] 2 NZLR 520 (CA). 
18 [1995] 1 NZLR 469 (HC) [Pratt Contractors].
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The court however held that this alternative tender was not an offer sufficiently precise to 
be accepted by the Council. It was not a tender for the purposes of the process initiated by the 
defendant. The plaintiff had been a victim of a breach of contract because once the Council 
purported to act within the tendering framework, it was obliged to award the contract to the 
tenderer submitting the lowest conforming tender. Loss of a chance damages compensated 
both the plaintiff's reliance interest (the preparatory costs involved in the tendering process) 
and its expectation interest (the profit that would have resulted by performance of the 
contract). 
The court in this case did not value the lost chance in percentage terms but on "an overall 
assessment in the round." 19 This is one way of compensating the plaintiff for its lost 100 per 
cent chance of getting the contract. In terms of the two contract approach, the plaintiff proved 
that but for the Council's breach of the secondary contract, it would have been awarded the 
primary contract. 
III EXTENSION TO TORT 
A Re­examination of the Tendering Process 
This paper has so far concluded that loss of a chance damages should be awarded to 
plaintiffs in cases which approximate the 'contest' paradigm of Chaplin v Hicks. The tendering 
cases are the first extension of the paradigm. They have all been contract cases. It is possible 
however that a certain fact scenario may be so close to the paradigm, that the fact that the 
cause of action is in tort is immaterial. Such was the case in Gregory v Rangitikei District 
Council. 20 
In this case the Council was held to owe a duty of care to the plaintiff in respect of the sale 
by tender of a roadman's cottage. The Council had legitimately not accepted any tenders, but 
had privately negotiated the cottage's sale shortly afterwards. This conduct was held to be in 
breach of the Council's duty of care which required the latter to follow statutory procedures 
in the sale of land. Therefore the plaintiff was compensated for his lost chance of purchasing 
the cottage. The paradigm should be extended to cover this situation as the 'contest­like' facts 
approximate Chaplin v Hicks in the same manner as the contractual cases. A tortious duty of 
19 Pratt Contractors above n 18, 489. 
20 [1995] 2 NZLR 208, 228 (HC) [Gregory].
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care compensates the plaintiff, deters the defendant and is non­speculative. This is consistent 
with the instrumentalist view of tort law. 
In Gregory the plaintiff had to sue in tort as although the Council probably owed a 
contractual duty to consider all tenders fairly, the terms were not breached. 21 However the 
fact that the duty found by McGechan J was only based on statutory provisions may mean 
that Gregory is of limited application. 22 As his Honour noted: 23 
The existence of a remedy in contract, alongside the alleged duty of care 'to properly consider' 
tenders received, counts heavily against recognition of a duty in that area. It is a situation where 
contract can be left to prevail. 
Therefore it appears that the existence of a contractual relationship militates strongly 
against the imposition of a duty of care in tort. The Chaplin v Hicks paradigm however offers 
an alternative rationale for the imposition of liability on the Council. 
B The Inadequacy of Contract 
An overly strict limitation of loss of a chance damages to the law of contract would have 
caused a manifest injustice in Gregory. 24 The same was true in the House of Lords' decision in 
White v Jones. 25 In this case, a solicitor had negligently failed to make certain changes in a 
client's will, before his death. As a result the intended beneficiary of the will received nothing. 
However, because of privity of contract, the solicitor owed no contractual duty of care to the 
disappointed beneficiary. Lord Goff allowed the plaintiff to recover for her lost chance of 
receiving a financial benefit by using tort in an essentially gap­filling role to fix liability via 
the solicitor's assumption of responsibility. 26 The existence of a contract was no bar to tort 
21 Gregory above n 20, 229. 
22 Duncan Webb "Liability in the Context of the Tender Process" (1996) 2 New Zealand Business Law 
Quarterly 102, 114. 
23 Gregory above n 20, 229. 
24 Gregory above n 20. 
25 [1995] 2 AC 207 (HL) [White v Jones]. 
26 See Lord Steyn's discussion of the limitations of English contract law in Williams and Another v Natural 
Life Health Foods Ltd and Mistlin (1998) 30 April (HL). See also B Hepple "The Search for Coherence" 
(1997) 50 Current Legal Problems 67.
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liability. 27 Tort law had to expand to meet the inadequacies of contract. A remedy in tort 
therefore circumvented the rigidity of the doctrines of privity and consideration. 
This result was anticipated twelve years earlier by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in 
Gartside v Sheffield, Young & Ellis. 28 On identical facts Cooke J (as he then was) outlined the 
importance of delivering corrective justice: 29 
To deny an effective remedy in a plain case would seem to imply a refusal to acknowledge the 
solicitor's professional role in the community. In practice the public relies on solicitors to prepare 
effective wills. 
Thus it is clear that to effect justice for the disappointed legatees in White v Jones 30 and 
Gartside 31 loss of a chance damages should clearly be available. The result is not speculative 
or based on an empirical probability. It is close to a 100 per cent certainty that had the 
solicitor not been negligent she would have inherited her legacy. Thus loss of a chance in this 
context delivers corrective justice and compensates the plaintiff's expectation interest. The 
general social welfare of society is increased if lawyers make fewer mistakes in the drafting of 
legal documents. The imposition of liability in this case strongly reinforces the instrumental 
goals of tort. 
C The Move to Concurrent Liability 
It appears that loss of a chance damages should be available in both tort and contract. This 
is consistent with the modern development of concurrent liability. In contract, the measure of 
damages gives the plaintiff the value of the contract had it been performed. The tort measure 
places the plaintiff in the position they would have been in had the tort not occurred. 
However the general principle is the same; the plaintiff should receive the monetary sum 
which, so far as money can, represents fair and adequate compensation for the loss of injury 
sustained by reason of the defendant's wrongful conduct. 32 
27 This is made clear by Henderson v Merett Syndicates Ltd above n 7. 
28 [1983] NZLR 37 (CA) [Gartside]. 
29 Gartside above n 28, 43. 
30 White v Jones above n 25. 
31 Gartside above n 28. 
32 Commonwealth of Australia v Amman Aviation Pty Ltd 104 ALR 1, 36 (HCA) [Amman Aviation].
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Although this general principle is the same, some jurists argue that because the rules 
governing its application differ in contract and tort, loss of a chance damages should be 
confined to contract. 33 It is submitted that this approach is incorrect. These differences are 
more formulaic and semantic than real. One difference is the requirement of damage in tort, 
in contrast to contract, where a cause of action accrues upon breach. However Sir John 
Donaldson MR outlined in Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority: 34 
even in contract, if more than a bare right of action is to be established, the plaintiff must prove a 
loss of substance…on the balance of probabilities. 
The tests for remoteness are another difference. In contract the damage must be 'within 
the reasonable contemplation of the parties' whereas in tort the damage must be reasonably 
foreseeable. Lord Scarman in H Parsons (Livestock) Ltd v Uttley & Co Ltd 35 thought the 
distinction was semantic and not substantial. Other commentators have argued forcefully that 
no other word or phrase other than 'reasonable' can describe the degree of foresight required 
for damage, whether in contract or tort. 36 
Thus it is submitted that these differences, in themselves should not prevent the recovery 
of loss of a chance damages in tort law. Confining loss of a chance damages to contract would 
reinforce the compartmentalisation of the law of obligations. In the Court of Appeal decision 
of Hotson, Sir John Donaldson MR pointed out the potentially anomalous consequences of 
confining loss of a chance damages to contract. 37 If this were so, then a patient who lost a 
chance of recovery due to the negligence of a doctor working in a public hospital (subject to 
the law of tort) would be without redress. However if the doctor were in private practice 
(subject to the law of contract) the patient would be compensated for the lost chance of 
recovery. 
This paper therefore advances the proposition that loss of a chance damages should be 
available in the general law of tort and not just the default rules of contract. However any 
33 See the approach of Deane J in Amman Aviation above n 32. 
34 Hotson above n 13, 760. 
35 [1978] 1 QB 791, 807 (CA). 
36 Jane  Swanton "Concurrent Liability in Tort and Contract: the Problem of Defining the Limits" (1996) 10 
Journal of Contract Law 19, 44. See further  Jane  Swanton "The Convergence Of Tort And Contract" 
(1989) 12 Sydney Law Review 40. 
37 Hotson above n 13, 760.
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tortious extension of the loss of a chance theory must be within the original paradigm. 
Therefore the writer disagrees with Lord Bridge's statement in Hotson that the perceived 
analogy between the contract cases where loss of a chance was accepted and tort cases was 
"superficially attractive." 38 The nature of the 'formidable difficulties in the way of accepting 
such an analogy' is unclear. 
IV NEGLIGENT ADVISERS 
A Introduction 
It is now necessary to examine whether or not the loss of a chance caused by the 
negligence of a professional adviser comes within the paradigm. The writer believes it does. 
Professional advisers are employed to minimise the risk of a future uncertainty. For example 
an auditor is employed to assess a company's accounts in order to see whether the company 
should stay in business or  be wound up. Without his or her professional service, the viability 
of the business would be uncertain. In terms of the 'contest' paradigm, a person who employs 
a professional adviser is contracting to avoid future uncertainty and therefore to ensure the 
contest takes place. 39 The right to be free of uncertainty rather than part of it, is the flip­side 
of the right to compete. Therefore compensation for the loss of a chance caused by a 
professional adviser's negligence is consistent with the Chaplin v Hicks paradigm. 
The approach of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in respect of professional adviser's 
negligence however is dichotomous. Within a year, on identical material facts the court has 
used both the loss of a chance theory to impose liability and the orthodox classification of 
damage. It is therefore unclear which classification of damages should prevail. 
B The Loss of a Chance Approach 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal awarded loss of a chance damages in Martelli McKegg 
Wells & Cormack  v Commbank International NV. 40 In this case the defendant solicitor's 
negligence caused the plaintiff debenture holder delay in appointing its own receivers, who 
would have managed the secured assets more profitably than the statutory receivers. In effect 
38 Hotson above n 13, 782. 
39 The contest clearly does not take place when  the negligent delay of a solicitor causes the plaintiff's 
right to argue their case in court to be time barred; See Kitchen v Royal Air Forces Association [1958] 2 All 
ER 241 (CA). 
40 (7 November 1996) unreported, CA 75/96 [Martelli McKegg].
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what was lost was  a retrospective negative chance; a chance of not losing so much money. 
The plaintiffs proved this lost  chance of appointing their own receivers at an earlier time to 
the balance of the probabilities standard. However the use of loss of a chance damages was 
not justified in terms of the Chaplin v Hicks paradigm. Instead the court employed a 
commonly used distinction between past and hypothetical facts. 
1 The past/hypothetical facts distinction 
The distinction between events which happened in the past and those which happened in 
the future is a prevalent solution to problems of causal indeterminacy by the Commonwealth 
courts. 41 It rests on the commonly quoted words of Lord Diplock in Mallet v McMonagle 
whereby: 42 
In determining what did happen in the past a court decides on a balance of probabilities. Anything 
that is more probable than not it treats as certain. But in assessing damages which depend upon its 
view as to what  will happen in the future or would have happened in the future had something not 
happened in the past, the court must make an estimate as to what are the chances that a particular 
thing will or would not have happened and reflect those chances, whether they are more or less 
than even, in the amount of damages it awards. 
41 Hotson above n 13, Malec v JC Hutton Pty Lt (1990)169 CLR 638 [Malec] see text at n 77; See also Janiak v 
Ippolito [1985] 1 SCR 146. In this last case the plaintiff was negligently injured by the defendant in a car 
accident. It was estimated  that the surgery which was required to rehabilitate injuries to the plaintiff's 
back sustained in the accident had a 70 per cent  chance of success. However the plaintiff refused to 
have the operation, and thus failed to mitigate his loss. Justice Wilson was not prepared to regard the 
future 70 per cent chance as a certainty and thus compensated the plaintiff for the remaining risk of 
continuing loss. This loss was assessed at 30 per cent of his future lost earnings. 
42 [1970] AC 166, 176 (HL) [Mallet v McMonagle]. See also Davies v Taylor [1974] AC 207 212, 213 where 
Lord Reid stated that: 
You can prove that a past event happened, but you cannot prove that a future event will 
happen and I do not think the law is so foolish as to suppose you can. All you can do is 
evaluate the chance. Sometimes it is virtually 100 percent: sometimes virtually nil. But often it 
is somewhere in between. And if it is somewhere in between I do not see much difference 
between a probability of 51 percent and a probability of  49 percent…If the balance of the 
probability were the proper test what is to happen in the two cases that I have supposed of a 
60 per cent and 40 per cent probability…I can see no ground that the 40 per cent case fails 
altogether, but the 60 per cent case gets 100 per cent…So I reject the balance of probability test 
in this case.
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An event in the past either did or did not occur so damages are assessed on an 'all or 
nothing' basis. Loss of a chance damages however are more appropriate in relation to an 
event which might or might not yet occur (future), or would or would not have occurred 
(hypothetical). The House of Lords cited Mallet v McMonagle 43 to distinguish Hotson from 
Chaplin v Hicks. In Chaplin v Hicks the chance depended on a hypothetical fact, whether or 
not the plaintiff would have won the contest if she had been selected. 44 By contrast in Hotson 
the chance depended on a matter of past fact, whether the defendant had developed the 
necrosis prior to the hospital's negligent diagnosis. Although there was a chance that the 
necrosis had not occurred prior to the negligent treatment, the rule in Mallet v McMonagle 45 
means that the factual chance is not recognised by the law as being a chance at all. 46 
Therefore in Martelli McKegg loss of a chance damages were justified as the court had to 
adjudicate a matter of hypothetical fact rather than one of past fact to which the ordinary civil 
standard would apply. The court tried to answer the hypothetical question of when the 
plaintiff would have appointed their receivers by calculating a weighted average of the 
chance of avoiding the loss. 47 
2 Criticism of the distinction 
The writer does not see any merit in the distinction. In cases of professional negligence the 
court has to decide what would have occurred in the absence of the negligent conduct. This is 
a hypothetical question. It is a question which may be answered in the past or in the future. It 
therefore becomes necessary to differentiate between events which are past historic and past 
43 Mallet v McMonagle above n 42. 
44 See Helen  Reece "Losses of Chances in the Law" (1996) 59 MLR 188 who seeks to rationalise the loss of 
a chance case law as either deterministic whereby  the orthodox rule of causation applies; or 
indeterministic in which case damages are assessed pursuant to the loss of a chance theory. See also 
Timothy Hill "A Lost Chance for Compensation: Negligence by the House of Lords" (1991) 54 MLR 511 
who outlines that a lost hypothetical chance is compensable as a personal chance but a lost chance in 
the past is only a statistical chance which does not merit compensation. 
45 Mallet v McMonagle above n 42. 
46 G Cooper "Damages for the Loss of a Chance in Contract and Tort" (1988) 52 Auck U L Rev 39, 41. 
47 The company was under statutory management from 15 March to 24 July. At the start of this period, 
there was only a 30 per cent chance of avoiding loss. This increased to a 75 per cent chance by 7 April 
and to 11 percent on 1 May. Aggregation of these percentages gave a discount of 17.5 per cent which 
was used to compute a figure for the 'likely lost sales.'
238 (1999) 29 VUWLR 
hypothetical. This becomes very confusing. To label the plaintiff's disability in Hotson a 'past 
historic' event and not 'past hypothetical' appears to be no more than a semantic distinction. 
It is an ineffective method of limiting loss of a chance liability. Such a distinction has the 
potential to revolutionise the law of damages as all damages questions are in a sense 
hypothetical questions. 48 This approach may open the door to treating all claims, not on the 
traditional 'all or nothing' basis but as hypothetical chances with damages proportional to the 
fault of the defendant. Therefore it is recommended that this distinction be abandoned. Any 
extension of the loss of a chance theory must instead be within the framework of the Chaplin v 
Hicks paradigm. In Martelli McKegg the plaintiffs contracted with the solicitors in order to 
minimise any uncertainty which might arise in respect of receivership. This ensured their 
paradigmatic right to compete. Their loss of this chance is therefore compensable on the 
grounds of the Chaplin v Hicks paradigm rather than the false distinction between past 
historic, past hypothetical, and future events. 
3 An English perspective 
The English Court of Appeal adopted a similar approach to Martelli McKegg in Allied 
Maples. 49 In  this case the plaintiff, a carpet retailer purchased certain businesses and shop 
properties from another furnishings group. As a result of the transaction the plaintiff was 
landed with a contingent liability which in due course materialised. The plaintiff argued that 
had its solicitors brought the risk of this contingent liability to their attention, they would 
have taken steps to indemnify themselves in respect of such open ended liability. Due to the 
defendant's negligence they lost this chance. 
First of all the plaintiff had to prove on the balance of the probabilities, that were it aware 
of the contingent liability it would have taken steps to protect itself. 50 Secondly it was then 
necessary to prove a substantial chance (which could be less than 50 percent) that 
48 S M Waddams "The Principles Of Compensation" in Essays on Damages (Ed) P D Finn (The Law Book 
Company, Sydney, 1992)  11. See also  J G Fleming "Probabilistic Causation in Tort Law ­A Postscript" 
(1991) 77 Canadian Bar Revue 136,140. 
49 Allied Maples above n 6; see also HW Wilkenson "The loss of a 'chance' in conveyancing transactions" 
(1996) 41 NLJ  88. 
50 A similar point arose in McWilliams v Sir William Arrol & Co Lt [1962] 1 All ER 623 (CA). In this case an 
employer breached its statutory duty by failing to supply the deceased employee with safety 
equipment. The evidence however suggested that even if the equipment had been provided, he would 
not have worn it. Thus recovery was denied.
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negotiations with the vendor would have lead to an indemnity. 51 Stuart Smith LJ in the 
majority judgement held that the plaintiffs had proved these two steps. However the writer 
believes that the dissenting judgment of Millet LJ is the better view. 
His Honour argued that the second step could not be established by the plaintiffs. On the 
facts the chance that the plaintiffs were deprived of was the chance of persuading the vendor 
to act against its own interests by accepting a warranty which its own solicitors had struck 
out. 52 Millet LJ, concerned at the speculative nature of this lost chance thought that there had 
to be some objective criteria by which the chance could be evaluated. Although the court 
could examine the relative bargaining strengths of the parties, the extent of the risk, and the 
effect on the deal if the vendor refused these were all unknown subjective matters which were 
unable to be inferred. 53 
C The Balance of the Probabilities Approach 
The loss of a chance approach exemplified in Martelli McKegg and Allied Maples is in stark 
contrast to both Sew Hoy & Sons (In Receivership and in Liquidation) v Coopers & Lybrand 54 and 
McElroy Milne v Commercial Electronics Ltd. 55 In Sew Hoy the Court of Appeal considered 
whether or not a company which continued trading after its auditors negligently certified its 
accounts as true and fair without qualification, could recover from the auditors the trading 
losses which it then incurred. Although the facts are materially indistinguishable from 
Martelli McKegg the Court of Appeal did not approach the issue on a loss of a chance basis. 
In Sew Hoy the creation of the opportunity to incur loss or alternatively the lost 
opportunity of modifying its business activities as appropriate to its true financial status, was 
not the relevant damage. 56 The plaintiff would have to prove on the balance of the 
probabilities that it suffered economic loss. However the court disagreed with the decision of 
51 Davies v Taylor above n 42. 
52 Allied Maples above n 6, 928. 
53 Millet LJ's  concern of the speculative nature of loss of a chance damages was  heeded in Stovold v 
Barlows (1995) The Times, 30 October. 
54 [1996] 1 NZLR 392 (CA) [Sew Hoy]. 
55 [1993] 1 NZLR 39, 41 (CA) [McElroy Milne]. 
56 Sew Hoy above n 54, 409.
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the English Court of Appeal in Galoo Ltd (In Liquidation) v Bright Grahame Murray (A Firm). 57 
In Galoo it was held on identical facts that the auditors' negligence only created the 
opportunity for the company to incur trading losses rather than any financial loss; therefore 
the auditors were not liable. By contrast the New Zealand Court of Appeal held that the 
negligent advice which persuaded a company to continue trading could be causative of loss. 
However Thomas J agreed with the statement in Galoo that the 'but for' test  was not a 
definitive test for causation: 58 
As a complete test [the 'but for'] test has long been regarded [as] suspect. But it need not be 
discarded. It provides a convenient starting point rather than a test…What is to be accepted is that 
an affirmative answer [to the 'but for' test] is not decisive to the question of causation. Within that 
framework the causal link will still need to be established. 
His Honour also stated that "commonsense" could not be the sole test of liability although 
it was a valuable adjunct to judicial reasoning. 59 This is consistent with McHugh J's 
dissenting judgment in March v Stramare. 60 A losing party has the right to know why it has 
lost and should not have its objections brushed aside with a reference to common sense. In 
sum, the best approach was to use the 'but for' test as a preliminary causative step and then 
inquire as to: 61 
whether the particular damage claimed is sufficiently linked to the breach of the particular duty to 
merit recovery in all the circumstances. 
The damages dichotomy is further evidenced by the Court of Appeal decision of McElroy 
Milne. 62 The facts of this case are materially indistinguishable from Allied Maples. In McElroy 
57 [1994] 1 WLR 1360 (CA) [Galoo]. 
58 Sew Hoy above n 54, 408. 
59 Sew Hoy above n 54, 408. 
60 (1991) 171 CLR 506, 533 [March v Stramare].  McHugh J however is more scathing in his attack on the 
utility of commonsense than Thomas J. His Honour termed the commonsense criterion as "at best an 
uncertain guide involving subjective, unexpressed, and undefined, extra legal values varying from one 
decision maker to another." 
61 McElroy Milne above n 55, per Cooke P, cited in Sew Hoy above n 54, 402. 
62 McElroy Milne above n 55; See also Brendon WF Brown Damages (NZLS Seminar, Wellington, 1997) 39 
["Damages"].
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Milne the plaintiffs had leased a new property development to an anchor tenant for 12 years. 
Their solicitors had negligently failed to secure a guarantee in respect of the lease from the 
lessor's parent company. As a result of the breach of contract the value of the plaintiff's asset, 
which was to marketed, fell considerably. The court however required the plaintiffs to prove 
causation using the traditional approach. 
D Resolution of the Dichotomy 
At present it is unclear whether or not the New Zealand Court of Appeal would endorse 
the categorisation of damages as loss of a chance. Martelli McKegg evidences a liberal 
approach to the question of damages. Sew Hoy and McElroy Milne reaffirm the orthodoxy. A 
choice must be made in favour of either approach. Ex ante certainty regarding the 
appropriate categorisation of damages is imperative for business people in New Zealand. It 
would not be fair if plaintiffs could elect to choose the most beneficial measure of damages. 
The damages award under the orthodox approach, is tightly constrained. For example in Sew 
Hoy the court clearly outlined that any loss that would have been incurred, notwithstanding 
the auditors' negligence, could not be compensated. 63 In contrast the damages awarded 
under the loss of a chance theory generally are a smaller percentage of a larger sum, as 
exemplified in Martelli McKegg. In that case the court calculated a weighted average of the 
entire value of the likely lost sales. It would be contrary to justice if plaintiffs could choose a 
theory of damages purely to maximise their financial return. 
It is clear that whatever approach is adopted, the 'but for' test is not the exclusive test for 
causation. As Mason CJ said in March v Stramare: 64 
In philosophy and science, the concept of causation has been developed in the context of explaining 
phenomena by reference to the relationship between conditions and occurrences. In law, on the 
other hand, problems of causation arise in the context of ascertaining or apportioning legal 
responsibility for a given occurrence. 
If the function of causation is to apportion legal responsibility then it is clear that any 
result from the 'but for' test will be tempered by value judgements and policy 
considerations. 65 The writer firmly believes that loss of a chance caused by negligent 
63 Sew Hoy above n 54, 401. 
64 March v Stramare above n 60, 509. 
65 March v Stramare above n 60; see further SM Waddams "Causation In Canada And Australia" (1993) 1 
The Tort Law Review 75, 76.
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professional advisers comes within the Chaplin v Hicks paradigm, and therefore should be 
regarded as compensable loss. It is then necessary to consider whether or not there are any 
countervailing policy considerations which militate against the imposition of loss of a chance 
damages in this class of case.  In this 'second stage' it is expedient to consider the degree to 
which loss of a chance damages reinforce the instrumental goals of tort law. 
1 Policy 
Damages for loss of a chance compensate the plaintiff who has suffered loss caused by the 
negligent professional adviser. However any argument based on deterrence really needs to be 
substantiated by empirical research. It is possible that loss of a chance liability would 
successfully deter negligent professional services. It is equally possible that if professional 
advisers are exposed to an increased risk of liability then the cost of their services will 
increase (as will professional liability insurance) and the range of services that they offer may 
decrease. This would be especially true if the advice was in respect of a high risk transaction, 
and would lead to a decrease in the general social welfare of society. However it is submitted 
that the better view is that in today's competitive market it is unlikely that loss of a chance 
liability would lead to a scaling down of services or escalation in prices. Professional services 
firms face fierce competition to attract and maintain a strong client base. If they were subject 
to loss of a chance liability it is submitted that extra care would be taken in respect of their 
proffered services. This reinforces the deterrence objective of tort law and maximises social 
utility. 
However it is crucial to bear in mind the cautionary words advanced by Millet LJ in Allied 
Maples concerning the speculative nature of the loss of a chance theory. Even though the loss 
of a chance approach is preferred to the orthodox categorisation of loss, it will be difficult for 
plaintiffs to prove that the hypothetical actions of third parties would occur. For example in 
McElroy v Milne it would be very difficult for the plaintiff to prove that the parent company 
would altruistically sign the guarantee document. 
2 Conclusion 
In sum the instrumental goals of tort are reinforced. It is submitted that there are no 
insurmountable policy considerations which bar loss of a chance damages in this context. 
Therefore it is possible to extend the Chaplin v Hicks paradigm. This view is clearly contrary to 
Sew Hoy and McElroy Milne, but consistent with Martelli McKegg and Allied Maples. Given the 
divided judicial acceptance of the loss of a chance theory, it may be preferable to develop a
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solution to professional negligence liability outside of the Chaplin v Hicks paradigm. One such 
solution is the reversal of the burden of proof. 
V ALTERNATIVES TO LOSS OF A CHANCE 
A Reversal of the Burden of Proof 
In England this approach attracted House of Lords support 25 years ago in the area of 
medical negligence. 66 Although their Lordships later distanced themselves from this 
controversial common law development, 67 the Canadian Supreme Court has recently 
adopted this technique in a more commercial context. 
In Rainbow Industrial Caterer Ltd v Canadian National Railway Co 68 the plaintiff entered into 
a contract to supply meals for work crews of the defendant railway. The price per meal was 
based on the defendant's estimate of the total number of meals that would be required. It 
turned out that far fewer meals were required; close to a 30 per cent reduction. The plaintiff 
suffered a $1,000,000 loss and terminated the contract. 
The plaintiff sought damages in an action for negligent misrepresentation. 69 The 
defendant however maintained that had Rainbow known the facts, they still would have 
entered the contract, at some higher price, and still suffered some loss. 70 Therefore Rainbow 
could not prove that 'but for' the negligent misrepresentation the loss would not have 
occurred. 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that though the legal burden generally rests with the 
plaintiff, it was not immutable. 71 Valid policy reasons could reverse the ordinary onus. 
Sopinka J stated that the onus should be reversed in this case so that the defendant bore the 
risk of non­persuasion. 72 Therefore the plaintiff did not have to negative all the speculative 
66 McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1 (HL). 
67 Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 323. 
68 84 DLR (4th) 291 (SCC) [Rainbow]. See also Snell v Farrell [1990] 2 SCR 311. 
69 In New Zealand a misrepresentation would be remedied under section 6 of the Contractual Remedies 
Act. 
70 Rainbow still would have suffered loss because of endemic systematic errors such as railway 
employees taking too much food. 
71 Rainbow above n 68, 297. 
72 Rainbow above n 68, 297.
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hypotheses about his position that may have occurred had the defendant not committed the 
tort. The burden of proof instead rested on the defendant who had set up the hypothetical 
situation. 
The Privy Council has displayed similar concern in relation to speculative claims albeit in 
a different context. In Brickenden v London Loan & Saving Co 73 a fiduciary breached their duty 
by the non­disclosure of material facts. Lord Thankerton stated that once the court had 
determined that the non­disclosure was material, speculation as to what course the plaintiff, 
on disclosure, would have taken is irrelevant. 74 
B Negligent Advisers 
Having established the history of the reversal of the onus it is now possible to assess the 
validity of such an action in relation to negligence caused by professional advisers. The 
leading case is Downs v Chappell. 75 In this case the plaintiffs purchased the first defendant's 
bookshop business. They did so on the basis of a letter from the second defendants, who were 
accountants, which detailed the annual turnover of the business and the gross profit 
percentage. The first defendant knew the figures in it were false, and was liable for the tort of 
deceit. The accountants had misrepresented the figures and were liable in negligence. 
Although the trial judge had found in favour of the plaintiffs on liability against each of 
the defendants, he concluded that the plaintiffs had not proved on the balance of the 
probabilities that they would not have completed the purchase had the true figures been 
disclosed.  In this manner the defendant's loss could be attributed to their inexperience as 
stationers, the opening of a rival bookshop, and a reduction in demand caused by an 
economic downturn, rather than the defendants' torts. 
Hobhouse LJ took the same approach as Sopinka J in Rainbow. 76 His Honour stated that 
the trial judge was wrong in asking the plaintiffs how they would have acted if they were 
told the truth. They were never told the truth by the first defendant nor given the correct 
figure by the accountants. All that needed to be proven was the fact that the plaintiffs entered 
the contract as a result of both the fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation. 
73 [1934] 3 DLR (PC) 465 [Brickenden]. 
74 Brickenden above n 73, 472. 
75 [1996] 3 All ER 344, (CA) [Downs v Chappell]. 
76 Downs v Chappell above n 75, 350­351.
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C Validity 
The reversal of the burden of proof is an extremely pro­plaintiff  development in the law. 
It unhesitatingly prefers the interests of the plaintiff to those of the defendant. It is a response 
to defendants' manipulation of the orthodox causation rule to escape liability. It thereby 
allows plaintiffs to recover when they would be thwarted under the traditional approach. 
However the reversal of the onus is not a common occurrence. It is difficult to discern why 
the burden of proof has been used in some cases, but not in others. Why for example did the 
English Court of Appeal not reverse the onus in Galoo as they did in Downs v Chappell? 
However there must be strong policy reasons justifying the departure from the status 
quo. The strongest policy justification in favour of reversing the onus is the elimination of 
hypothetical speculative claims put forward by defendants desirous of escaping liability. In 
this regard, this approach is to be preferred to the loss of a chance theory. 
Arguably the reversal of the onus over­compensates the plaintiff and over­deters the 
defendant. This is true where it is equally probable that the damage was caused by two 
different events. Here an onus reversal does not solve the problem of a defendant paying for 
the full amount of damages that he or she has not been shown to the balance of the 
probabilities to have caused. It is an ad hoc solution created by  pro­plaintiff courts in 
response to evidential uncertainty. However in Rainbow and Downs v Chappell the judiciary 
are not responding to evidential uncertainty. The overriding policy is to minimise the spectre 
of hypothetical speculative claims. 
Therefore in the negligent adviser cases discussed above, the reversal of the burden of 
proof would be a viable alternative to loss of a chance damages. For example in Sew  Hoy if 
the onus were reversed, the auditors could allege that even if the accounts were correct the 
company would still have incurred certain losses. The auditors  would  no longer be able to 
speculate as to what the company would have done had it not been given negligent advice. 
VI LOSS OF A COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITY 
A Introduction 
The loss of a chance paradigm has been formulated and extended from the generalised 
contest­like facts of Chaplin v Hicks. This paradigm acts to limit the compensation of the entire 
spectrum of lost chances. If a new class of lost chance is to be compensated, it must come 
within the paradigm. So far, lost tendering chances and lost opportunities caused by the 
negligence of professional advisers have come within the paradigm. The issue which this
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paper now considers is whether the loss of a purely commercial opportunity should be 
compensated. 
B The Expansionary Approach of the Australian High Court 
The Australian High Court has firmly encouraged this extension. The embers of the 
compensation for loss of a commercial opportunity are evident in the High Court's decision 
in Malec. 77 In Malec the plaintiff was employed by the defendant in a meatworks. Due to the 
negligence of the employer he contracted brucellosis which caused a neurotic illness. 78 This in 
effect meant that the plaintiff was unemployable. The trial judge  found however, that a 
variant of the  neurotic condition which the plaintiff suffered from as a result of the 
brucellosis more likely than not would have manifested itself as a result of an unrelated back 
condition in 1982. Thus the Supreme Court of Queensland awarded no damages for lost 
earnings after 1982 because 'all or nothing' causation could not be established. 
The majority in the  High Court 79 however justified loss of a chance (of future earnings) 
damages on the basis of the past/hypothetical facts distinction; a distinction which this paper 
has discredited. 80 The High Court stated that: 81 
The probability [of the lost chance] may be very high ­ 99.9 per cent ­ or very low ­ 0.1 per cent. But 
unless the chance is so low as to be regarded as speculative ­ say less than 1 per cent ­ or so high as 
to be practically certain ­ say over 99 per cent ­ the court will take that chance into account in 
assessing the damages. 
However the same court stated in Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL and Ors that: 82 
neither in logic nor in the nature of things is there any reason for confining the approach taken in 
Malec concerning the proof of future possibilities and past hypothetical situations to the assessment 
of damages for personal injuries. 
77 Malec above n 41; See also the approach of Dawson J in Wynn v NSW Insurance 133 ALR 154, 162­163 
(HCA) in relation to tortious compensation for future economic loss. 
78 An infectious disease of cattle goats and pigs, caused by bacteria and transmittable to man. 
79 Deane, Gaudron and McHugh. JJ 
80 Malec above n 41, 643. 
81 Malec above n 41, 643. 
82 Sellars above n 4, 25.
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Therefore the reasons which the court used to justify the application of loss of a chance in 
Malec could be applied, in the court's opinion,  with equal  force to damages for loss of a 
commercial opportunity. The Sellars case concerned a company, Adelaide Petroleum, which 
had entered into parallel negotiations with  two other companies, Pagini and Poseidon. 
Adelaide's aim was to persuade either of these two companies to acquire the management's 
share­holding as part of its corporate restructuring. Although a draft contract was prepared 
with Pagini, Adelaide's directors decided to enter into an arrangement with Poseidon. 
However three weeks after the heads of agreement were signed, Poseidon repudiated the 
contract. Subsequently Adelaide negotiated with Pagini for a second time and was able to 
come to an agreement  but on less favourable terms.  Adelaide then sued Poseidon for the 
loss of their opportunity to secure commercial benefits which a contractual agreement with 
Pagini would have guaranteed. 
In Sellars the plaintiffs sought relief under a statutory provision which granted damages 
for false representations which either induced a person to act or refrain from acting. 83 The 
High Court endorsed the Malec principle's commercial application and stated that there was 
no rational basis for distinguishing between damages for deprivation of commercial 
opportunity in contract, the statutory provision, or the law of torts. 84 Damages would be 
assessed by reference to the court's estimate of the prospect of success of the opportunity had 
it been pursued. 85 
C Loss of a Commercial Opportunity: Outside the Paradigm 
It is submitted that the decision of the High Court in Sellars lies on the spectrum of lost 
chances which falls outside the Chaplin v Hicks paradigm. First the court justifies loss of a 
chance damages on the past/hypothetical facts distinction. As this paper has argued, such a 
distinction is more apparent than real. It is only a methodological tool which permits a 
judicially active judge to arrive at his or her desired outcome without any policy justification. 
Broad distinctions like this one are not uncontroversial in other areas of tort law. For example 
the policy/operational distinction has attracted considerable criticism. 86 
83 The Trade Practices Act ss2 52 82(1). 
84 Sellars above n 4, 30, 36. 
85 Sellars above n 4, 30. 
86 See Stovin v Wise & Norfolk County Council [1996] 3 All ER 801 (HL) 812 per Lord Hoffmann.
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1 The degree of speculation 
The alleged lost opportunity is also too speculative. Just like in Malec the plaintiff only 
had to show some non­negligible loss of opportunity. Although the lost opportunity of 
continuing negotiations with Pagini was definitely non­negligible; on the balance of 
probabilities the contract would not have been completed. 87 This is evident given the 
numerous contingencies which would have frustrated the successful completion of the 
contract. 88 First the negotiations had to be satisfactorily concluded. French J, the trial judge 
assessed this probability as 'high'. Secondly an underwriter for the share issue had to be 
found. Thirdly there were seven conditions precedent in the contract which had to be 
satisfied. The court at first instance considered that there was a 'reasonable' prospect and at 
least an even chance of surmounting these two obstacles. The finalisation of a deal with 
Pagini thus would have been difficult. The lost chance therefore amounted to the 
multiplication of these three mathematical probabilities. By means of example suppose that 
there was a 75 per cent chance of concluding the contract, and a 50 per cent chance for both 
obtaining an underwriter and satisfying the conditions precedent. Multiplying these three 
probabilities together gives a lost chance of 18.75 per cent. It is difficult to see why this lost 
chance was held to be compensable loss given that it was subject to such serious and clearly 
speculative contingencies. 
Even though the lost chance in Sellars is numerically approximately the same as the lost 25 
per cent chance in Chaplin v Hicks the two cases concern diametrically different facts. It is not 
possible to extend the paradigm to cover a Sellars type situation. There is no 'contest­like' set 
of facts, nor a contract to minimise future uncertainty. The loss of a commercial opportunity 
is not at all consistent with the other categories of loss that have come within the paradigm. 
Therefore it is not a valid option for the High Court to rely on the authority of Chaplin v Hicks. 
2 Over and under­ compensation 
The majority in Sellars also stated that the ratio decicendi was supported by other 
considerations: 89 
87 The lost opportunity of continuing negotiations included obtaining the financial benefits which 
completion of the contract would have entailed. 
88 Sellars above n 4, 32­33. 
89 Sellars above n 4, 30.
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The [loss of a chance] approach results in fair compensation whereas the all or nothing outcome 
produced by the civil standard of proof would result in the vast majority of cases in over­ 
compensation or under compensation to an applicant who has been deprived of a commercial 
opportunity. 
This argument is illusory. Under the loss of a chance theory the defendant pays for the 
percentage likelihood that he or she caused the damage; the loss of the commercial 
opportunity. In reality the damage is not at all partially caused by the defendant. It either is or 
it is not. Though the solution may be just in the aggregate, it fails to work effective justice 
between the individual plaintiff and the defendant. 90 If the defendant actually caused a 
commercial opportunity to be lost, the plaintiff is under­compensated; if he or she did not 
cause the chance to be lost, the plaintiff is over­compensated. The writer argues that plaintiffs 
will be over or under­compensated  under both loss of a chance or 'all or nothing' causation. 
The advantage of the former approach however, is that it eliminates the arbitrary unfairness 
engendered by the latter. 
3 Contrary view 
This paper has concluded that Sellars was wrongly decided and that the case falls outside 
the Chaplin v Hicks paradigm. This view is not uncontroversial. 
Waddams has supported the High Court of Australia's decision in Sellars. 91 By 
paraphrasing the words of Fletcher Moulton LJ in Chaplin v Hicks Waddams argues that if a 
plaintiff is deprived of a chance of considerable value that many people would give money for 
then that the lost chance should be compensable. 92 The writer submits that a theory of loss of 
a chance damages premised on a paradigm of value alone is not the law in New Zealand. 
Everyday in New Zealand there are chances of considerable value that many people give 
money for, whether it be a person paying premiums on an insurance policy, a stockbroker 
90 LR Ellis "Loss of Chance as Technique: Toeing the Line at Fifty Percent" (1993) 72 Texas L Rev 369 398, 
402. 
91 S M Waddams "Damages: Assessment of Uncertainties" (1998) 13 Journal of Contract Law 55,66 
["Assessment of Uncertainties"]. 
92 "Assessment of Uncertainties" above n 91, 61.
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speculating on the stock exchange, or a sporting enthusiast gambling at the TAB. It is not 
disputed that all these chances although speculative, are of value. However if any of the 
above people were negligently denied the above chances and compensated in accordance 
with a value paradigm, then the proverbial spectre of indeterminate liability of an 
indeterminate amount to an indeterminate class would well be nigh. 
The conceptual foundation of the Chaplin v Hicks paradigm mirrors the methodology of 
the House of Lords retreat from their decision in Anns v Merton London Borough Council. 93 
Whereas the value paradigm advocated by Waddams leads to open ended liability for the 
loss of a chance, the 'contest' paradigm advanced in this paper only leads to incremental 
extensions of loss of a chance liability. 
D The New Zealand Position 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal adopted a similar approach to loss of a chance 
damages in Takaro Properties Ltd v Rowling. 94 In this case the negligent refusal of the Minister 
of Finance to consent to the issue of shares to a foreign corporation led to the failure of a 
property development which the plaintiff was to undertake with funds to be provided from 
the share capital and other finance. The Court of Appeal's judgment was overruled on other 
grounds by the Privy Council without comment on the approach to damages. The trial judge 
did not believe that causation had been established. Although it was possible that the 
development would be profitable, on the balance of the probabilities it would be 
unprofitable. 
The Court of Appeal disagreed. The correct approach was to consider whether or not 
there was some chance of success and then to value the lost commercial opportunity. 95 This 
approach identifies the wrongly withheld consent as a valuable asset because of the 
opportunities for a profitable enterprise that could have subsequently have flowed from it. 96 
93 [1991] 1 AC 398 (HL). 
94 Takaro Properties Lt v Rowling [1986] 1 NZLR 22, 54 (CA) per Somers J [Takaro]; Damages above n  62, 36. 
95 Takaro above n 91, 63. The same approach was adopted by the Court of Appeal in Craig v East Coast 
Bays City Council [1986] 1 NZLR 99 (CA). 
96 Takaro above n 91, 35.
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However the assessment of 'some' chance will inevitably be speculative. If plaintiffs can 
frame a cause of action based on the lost of 'some' chance, then there is the potential for 
unlimited liability. It is submitted that this is an unwise development in the law. As stated 
above it creates uncertainty in the business community due to the ex ante impossibility of 
identifying a real and substantial non­speculative chance. 
E Summary 
In summary it is submitted that damages can never be awarded for lost commercial 
opportunities as this class of lost chance lies outside the Chaplin v Hicks paradigm. The writer 
disagrees with the modern expansionary approach taken by the Commonwealth courts. It is 
recommended that a more appropriate and internally consistent approach would be to 
incrementally expand the loss of a chance theory in accordance with the Chaplin v Hicks 
paradigm. The paradigm is the tool by which to argue by analogy. In addition to non­ 
compliance with the Chaplin v Hicks paradigm, the loss of a commercial opportunity is very 
speculative. It is difficult to see exactly how judges can award damages in this class of lost 
chance and at the same ensure that the veracity of the claim is upheld. 
Reversal of the burden of proof however is not an appropriate alternative in this class of 
loss. In the case of a lost chance caused by the negligence of a professional adviser, it is the 
defendant who advances speculative claims in order to escape liability. The reversal of the 
onus minimises this speculation. However in respect of a lost commercial opportunity it is 
the plaintiff who is relying on mere speculation in order to impose liability. Therefore a 
reversal of the onus would not result in effective justice in the circumstances. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
This paper has exposed the limits of loss of a chance damages by critically assessing the 
modern expansionary approach taken by the Commonwealth courts. This has been done by 
developing a paradigm based on the generalised facts of Chaplin v Hicks. Loss of a chance 
damages could be awarded in circumstances which approximated a contest and where there 
were a finite number of competitors who had a mathematical chance of winning. This was 
true of the 'tendering' cases. The loss of a chance theory was then expanded to fill in the gaps 
of contract law exposed by the doctrine of consideration and privity of contract. In this 
manner loss of a chance damages were not limited to the 'default' rules of contract law but 
also applied to the 'general' law of tort. This development is consistent with the current trend 
of concurrent liability which discourages the rigid compartmentalisation of the law of 
obligations.
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The loss of a chance paradigm is also flexible enough to cover lost chances occasioned by 
the negligence of professional advisers. People contract with professional advisers to 
minimise future uncertainty. The right to be free of this uncertainty is the flip­side of the right 
to be part of the contest. Therefore the lost chance caused by the negligence of a professional 
adviser is compensable. There are no countervailing policy considerations in this class of case 
as loss of a chance damages reinforce the policy objectives of tort law. 
The approach of the New Zealand Court of Appeal however has been dichotomous. As 
the paradigm covers this lost chance, the writer advocates that the approach of the Court of 
Appeal in Martelli  McKegg is to be preferred to their approach in McElroy Milne and Sew Hoy. 
However the writer dismisses the past/hypothetical facts distinction which is commonly 
used to justify loss of a chance damages. This is only a methodological tool which permits the 
judicially active judge to arrive at a conclusion without adequate policy justification. The sole 
justification of compensating a lost chance caused by a negligent professional adviser is that it 
lies within the paradigm which in turn  is uncontroverted by policy. 
However given that the New Zealand Court of Appeal has adopted differing approaches 
with respect to loss of a chance damages on materially indistinguishable facts, this paper has 
considered the reversal of the burden of proof as an alternative solution. It has concluded that 
only the strongest policy reasons can justify a departure from the normal rule. Such a 
departure is justified if it effectively minimises purely hypothetical and speculative claims 
advanced by the defendant. 
Finally the paper considered where, on the spectrum of lost chances, a lost commercial 
opportunity lay. In contrast the possibility exists for the courts to extend the Chaplin v Hicks 
paradigm to cover novel classes of loss. In this way, just as the categories of negligence are 
never closed, neither are the categories of loss. 97 If the lost chance is in tort then it is necessary 
to consider issues of policy. The policy stage is a check back to the paradigm and it ensures 
that loss of chance damages will be justified only if they reinforce the fundamental objectives 
of tort law. In this way compensation for the loss of a chance is a subset of the general law of 
damages. 
97 Hotson above n 13, 761 (CA) per Sir John Donaldson MR.
